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Secundum Hugonem,[[1]](#endnote-1) est ad diuersa regere et dirigi. Ad diuersa regi quod est necessaria homini in vita ista propter varia in quibus occupatur, ad instar marche. Vnde sicut est in naui quod omnes debent intendere ad direccionem Dei summi rectoris, Prou. 16[:9]: *Cor hominis disponit viam suam, sed Domini est dirigere gressus eius*. Sic dicit Aristoteles 8 *De animalibus*,[[2]](#endnote-2) apes diriguntur per regem suum. Ideo quando habent ipsum secum prosperantur, set quando non, nequaquam. Sic quando homines habent ipsum Deum proteccione, Gen. 39[:21-23]: *Dominus fuit cum Joseph … et dirigebat opera eius*.

¶ Item, Prou. 23[:19]: *Esto sapiens, et dirige in via animum tuum*. Hoc fit tripliciter.

Primo, per cordis contricionem, Jer. 31[:21]: *Statue tibi speculam; pone tibi amaritudines; dirige cor tuum in viam rectam in qua ambulasti*. Res perdita non melius inuenitur quam si in via pristina ambulet, sic inuenitur Deus a nobis.

¶ Secundo, per oris confessionem, Prou. 28[:13]. Psal. [118:7]: *Confitebor tibi in directione cordis*.

Tercio, per operis satisfaccionem, [2] Thes. 3[:5]: *Dominus dirigat corda vestra* et corpora vestra *in caritate*. Secundum Doctorem Philosophi, 3 *Ethicorum*,[[3]](#endnote-3) volentem procedere de vicio ad virtutem. Oportet facere sicut faciunt qui dirigunt ligna tortuosa. Qui ponunt inter duo recta ligna per compressionem. Sic nos debemus ponere corda nostra inter caritatem Dei Patris et pacienciam Filii, et tunc *erunt praua in directa*, Ysai. 40[:4].

1. Huguccio, *Derivationes* R 22 (2:1021): [1] **Rego**-is -xi -ctum, unde **rectus** -a -um, et comparatur ... [20] ... **dirigo** -is, quasi in diversam partem regere .... [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Aristotle, *History of Animals*, 9.40, 624a26-27 (Barnes 1:971): The kings never quit the hive, except in conjunction with the entire swarm, either for food or for any other reason. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 3.4, 1113a15-23 (Barnes 2:1757): That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say that the good is the object of wish must admit in consequence that that which the man who does not choose aright wishes for is not an object of wish (for if it is to be so, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened, bad); while those who say the apparent good is the object of wish must admit that there is no natural object of wish, but only what seems good to each man. Now different things appear good to different people, and, if it so happens, even contrary things. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)